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IPROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION SIXTY
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
IN the interest of pro rata distribution of the debtor's estate among all
creditors,1 Section 60 2 of the Bankruptcy Act seeks, generally, to void any
attempt to secure preference by a creditor who becomes aware of his debtor's
insolvency shortly prior to bankruptcy. 3 The American Bar Association's
proposed amendment 4 raises again the hoary issue of the extent of this
1. Hearings 'before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
121 (1937). "Equality of distribution is the key note of every distribution of estates of
insolvent debtors." Analysis of H.R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1936). See Mc-
Laughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. or Cm. L.
REV. 369-72 (1937); Oglebay, Proposed Revision of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act:
Step Backward, 21 J.N.A. REF. BANKE. 54, 57 (1947); Comment, 41 Micir. L. R&v.
473, 478 (1942) ; Note, 10 U. OF CmL L. RFv. 220, 221 (1943).
2. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 32 STAT. 799 (1903), 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 44
STAT. 666 (1926), 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1940), hereafter cited by section
only. The portions of the present text of § 60 relevant to this discussion are:
"(a) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property
of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt,
made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the
filing by or against him of the petition in bankruptcy, or of the original petition
under chapter 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class. For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section,
a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far
perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could there-
after have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights
of the transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy or of the original petition under chapter 10, 11, 12 or
13 of this title, it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy.
"(b) Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving
it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at the
time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is in-
solvent. . ."
3. 3 CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 739-50 (14th ed., Moore and Oglebay, 1941) ; 2 GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 376 (1940).
For detailed discussion of the statute, see infra pp. 828-32, 837 et seq.
With the American position that invalidity of a preferential transfer depends upon
the creditor's having "reason to know" of the debtor's insolvency, contrast the English
rule making the debtor's intent determinative, 3 CoLIeR, BANxKRUPTCY 759-62; 2 GLENN,
op. cit. supra, § 378-9; Glenn, The Diversities of the Preferential Transfer: A Study in
Bankruptcy History, 15 CORN. L. Q. 521, 532 (1930).
4. H.R. 2412 and S. 826, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Both bills were introduced
in March, 1947. Hearings before the Senate and House Judiciary Committees have not
yet been scheduled. The Association's draftsmen were Professors John Hanna and James
A. McLaughlin, and Messrs. J. Francis Ireton, Milton P. Kupfer and Homer J. Living-
ston. For discussion of the amendment, see Ireton, A Proposal to Amend Section 60a of
the Bankruptcy Act, A6 CoRP. REORG. 257 and n.2 (1947) (giving the history of the
proposed amendment) ; Kupfer and Livingston, Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust
Company v. Klauder Revisited: A Supplenwntary Note, 33 VA. L. Rav. 1, 6-12 (1947)
McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L. REv. 233, 252 et seq.
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policy's application against the secured creditoi who conceals the nature
of his lien against the debtor's estate until the latter's insecure financial
condition dictates disclosure.5
Until 1938, transactions such as real property conveyances, chattel mort-
gages 7 and equitable liens,$ all securing to one specific creditor an interest in
the debtor's property, were treated as valid against the trustee even though
undisclosed until immediately before bankruptcy. In consequence, general
creditors who had relied on the debtor's visible assets in extending credit
frequently found themselves suddenly dependent upon largely non-existent
estates.
In seeking to ameliorate this injustice,9 the draftsmen of the Chandler
Act of 1938 10 made no attempt to establish a federal standard of lien noto-
riety but pinned their requirements to state law.1' Accordingly, Section 60
subjects secret liens to attack by the trustee only where local law requires
their publication on penalty of subordination in local actions not only to the
claims of the debtor's creditors but also to those of bona fide purchasers from
him. Manifestly, this gives the trustee powers unavailable to individual
creditors acting alone against the estate, a discrepancy justified in the minds
of the draftsmen by the iniquity of the secret lien.
(1946). But see Keeffe, Kelly, and Lewis, Sick Sixty: A Proposed Rcision of Section
60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 CoNr. L. Q. 99 (1947) (with a suggested "amendment"
to the proposed amendment). Another amendment to § 60a, proposed by the National
Bankruptcy Conference, has been introduced by Representative Hobbs, (D. Ala.), since
this comment was written. The nevW bill is substantially similar to the A.B.A. proposal
herein discussed. H.R. 5834, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
5. Every major revision of the bankruptcy laws since 1893 has seen Congressional
action against the secret lien, followed invariably, until the Chandler Act, by judicial
emasculation. For typical Congressional comment, see 35 CONG. Rrc. 6937, 6941-3 (1902) ;
45 Id. at 2271, 2273-5, 2278-9 (1910) ; 67 Id. at 6S01 (1926) tassim. See also Hirschfeld
v. Nogle, 5 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Ill. 1933) (comment on debates and statutory history).
Extensive treatment is given the history of § 60 in 3 CoLumn, BAinurCY 263-91.
6. Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916). See cases cited, 3 CoTLIe, Bma;murrcc
921 n.7.
7. Martin v. Commercial National Bank, 245 U.S. 513 (1918). See cases cited 3
CorLn, BANKRUPTCY 927 n.14-16.
8. Sext6n v. Kessler & Co., 225 U.S. 90 (1912). See cases cited, 3 CoyLIym, BAK-
RupTcY 881 n.51.
9. H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1937).
10. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1940). The Chandler Act vas the
result of many years study by the National Bankruptcy Conference, an unofficial body
representing, among other groups, the American Bar Association, the National Associ-
ation of Referees in Bankruptcy, the Commercial Law League of America, the National
Associatiodi of Credit Men, the American Bankers Association, the United States
Chamber of Commerce, the American Institute of Accountants and various law schools.
Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3
(1937). Professor McLaughlin of Harvard, who had long urged revision of § 60, pre-
sented the final draft, enacted without change, to the House Committee. Id. at 120-31.
11. For criticism of the dependence of creditors' rights in bankruptcy on varying
state law, see Keeffe, Kelly, and Lewis, supra note 4, at 109-11.
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It is on this point that the proposed amendment 12 takes exception to the
present statute. Under the suggested change, the trustee would be limited
to the powers of the individual creditors for whom he acts in collecting the
estate.
I. SECTION SIXTY OF THE CHANDLER ACT AND THE PROPOSED AmENDmENT
Before attempting appraisal of the amendment's effect in terms of individ-
ual security devices, it is necessary to orient the proposal within the con-
12. H. R. 2412, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), would substitute for the present version
of § 60a, the following:
"(1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made
or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of the original petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, the effect of
which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than some other creditor of the same class: Provided, however, That this section shall
have no application to proceedings under chapter IX of this Act.
"(2) For the purpose of subdivisions a and b of this section, and subject to the pro-
visions of paragraph (3), a transfer shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at
the time when it became so far perfected that no creditor obtaining under applicable law
by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract a lien on such property without a
special priority (whether or not such a creditor exists), could acquire, after such per-
fection, any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee
therein, and if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing of the original petition
initiating a proceeding under this Act, it shall be deemed to have been made immediately
before the filing of such original petition: Provided, however, That where real property
is transferred for or on account of an antecedent debt, the transfer shall be deemed to
have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser
from the debtor could acquire, after such perfection, any rights in the property so trans-
ferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein.
"(3) A transfer, wholly or in part, for or on account of a new and contemporane-
ous consideration shall, to the extent of such consideration and interest thereon and the
other obligations of the transferor connected therewith, be deemed to be made or suffered
at the time of the transfer, unless the applicable law requires the transfer to be perfected
by recording, delivery or otherwise, in order that no creditor described in paragraph (2)
could acquire, after such perfection, any rights in the property so transferred superior to
the rights of the transferee therein. A transfer to secure a future loan, if such loan is
actually made, or a transfer which becomes security for a future loan, shall have the same
effect as a transfer for or on account of a new and contemporaneous consideration. If
any requirement specified in this paragraph (3) exists, the time of the transfer shall be
determined by the following rules:
"I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not more
than thirty days after the transfer within which recording, delivery, or some other
act is required, and compliance therewith is had within such stated period of time;
or where (B) the applicable law specifies no such stated period of time or where such
stated period of time is more than thirty days, and compliance therewith is had within
thirty days after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered at
the time of the transfer.
"II. Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer is not had in ac-
cordance with the provisions of subparagraph I, the transfer shall be deemed to be
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voluted statutory scheme for avoidance of preferences. A transfer of the
debtor's property to a creditor for an antecedent debt within four months
before bankruptcy is a preference, under Section 60, provided it is made
while the debtor is insolvent and results in the creditor's receiving a percent-
age of his debt greater than that obtained by other equally situated claim-
ants. 3 In order to invalidate a preference, the trustee must prove that the
creditor had reasonable cause to know of the debtor's insolvency." All of
these elements, except the test of greater percentage, 15 are determined as
of the date the transfer was "made"; 10 it is on the method employed to fix
that date that the present statute and the proposed amendment differ.
made or suffered at the time of compliance therewith, and if such compliance is not
had prior to the filing of the original petition initiating a proceeding under this Act,
such transfer shall be deemed to have been made or suffered immediately before the
filing of such original petition."
13. Section 60a.
14. Section 60b. Proof of reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent
is a question of fact; the burden of proof is on the trustee to overcome the presumption
of good faith on the part of a creditor who has received a payment of his debt. See 3
COL.oIER, BANKRUPTCY 989-1014.
15. Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227 (1936). Before this de-
cision, there had been some conflict as to whether the percentage test should be applied
at the time the transfer is executed by the parties, or, as the Palner case prescribed, when
bankruptcy results. See Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown, supra at 228 It is now
well settled that the actual effect of the preferential transfer at the time of bankruptcy
is determinable. 3 CoLLUU6 BANKRUPTCY 863-5.
16. Before the Supreme Court decision in Com Fxchange National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), some courts held that even under the Chandler Act,
whether a transfer had been executed for an antecedent debt was to be determined as of
the date of execution, not necessarily when the Bankruptcy Act considered it "made."
Adams v. City Bank & Trust Co., 115 F.2d 453 (C.C.A. Sth 1940), cert. dc.ied, 312 U.S.
699 (1941); see Comment, 41 MicH. L. REv. 473 (1942); Notes, 29 CAXnw. L. Rsv. 522,
524 (1941), 41 CoL. L. Rnv. 512 (1941), 36 Ir.. L Rv. 783 (1942), 10 U. or Ciii L.
Rv. 220, 222 et seq. (1943) ; In re Talbot Canning Corp., 35 F. Supp. 6S0 (D. Md. 1940),
39 F. Supp. 858 (D. Md. 1941), rezvd on other grounds sub nom. Associated Seed Grow-
ers v. Geib, 125 F.2d 683 (C.C.A. 4th 1942) ; Note, 40 Mic. L. REV. 105 (1941) ; In re
E. H. Webb Grocery Co., 32 F. Supp. 3 (M.D. Tenn. 1940). For criticism of these cases
and anticipation of the Klauder decision, so far as the antecedent debt problem is con-
cerned, see 3 CoLLmR, BANKRUPTCY 911-4; Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems Under Sec-
tion 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 CoL. L. REv. 58, 65 (1943) ; Mulder, Ambiguities in
the Chandler Act, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 22-4 (1940) ; Salter, Perfection of Title of a
Lienor wider Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Cos. L. J. 242, 243 (1943) ; Snedel:er,
Security Devices as Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Act, 8 Mo. L REY. 85, 88 (1943) ;
Note, 10 U. oF CHi. L. Rv. 220-4 (1943). But see Wolfe, Current Bankruptcy Contro-
versies, 17 TEmp. L. Q. 64 (1942).
There is no doubt that the draftsmen intended all elements of a preference except the
greater percentage test to be tested as of the time the transfer was "made." McLaughlin,
Defining A Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HAav. L REv. 233, 245 (1946).
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Section Sixty of the Chandler Act
Section 60 now treats a transfer as "made" only when it has been
"so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and
no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property
so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein. .. ."
Unless the transferee has fully publicized the nature of his interest in the
debtor's property to the extent required by local law, the perfection test
considers as subsequent in law a transfer simultaneous in fact. If not so
perfected, the transfer is in law deemed "made" immediately before bank-
ruptcy 17 for a debt consequently "antecedent," although, in fact, execution
of the transfer and creation of the debt may have occurred simultaneously.
Accordingly, the creditor who wishes to protect his security interest from
possible invalidation under the preference section must now do everything
within his power "in order to make the transfer so complete that it would be
good against the whole world." 18
Two decisions applying this test to assignments of accounts receivable
have particularly aggravated the agitation for amendment. In Corn Ex-
change National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klatuder,9 applicable local law permitted
a creditor-assignee to perfect his interest against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser only by notifying the obligor of the assignment. Since no notice
had been given, the Supreme Court viewed the transfer as "made" immedi-
ately prior to bankruptcy and held it, in consequence, subject to attack.
In re Vardaman Shoe Co.,2" a district court decision, carried to a logical
extreme the Klauder dictum that,
"So long as the transaction is left open to possible intervening rights
to . . . [a subsequent bona fide purchaser], it is vulnerable to the
intervening bankruptcy." 21
Here, unlike the Klauder situation, local law validated the assignment of
accounts receivable when executed; a subsequent bona fide transferee could
17. Section 60a.
18. WE xNs1aN, THE BANHRUPTCY LAW or 1938 120 (1938).
19. 318 U.S. 434 (1943). The aftermath of this decision has seen a plethora of
comment. See Douglas, Assigned Accounts as Affected by Section 60a of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the Provisions of State Law with Reference Thereto, 19 J. N. A. REP.
BANKRM 11 (1944); Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems Under Section 60A of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 43 CoL L. REv. 58, 69 et seq. (1943) ; Kupfer and Livingston, Corn Exchange
National Bank & Trust Company' v. Klauder Revisited: The Aftcrnwth of its 11nplica-
tions, 32 VA. L. REv. 910 (1946) ; Montgomery, Review of Supreme Court Ruling on
Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 17 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 119 (1943). See also 3
COLmER, BANKRuPcY 70-2 (1946 Supp.); McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bank-
ruptcy, 60 HAgv. L. Ray. 233, 248-50 (1946); Notes, 29 CORN. L. Q. 105 (1943), 18
J. N. A. REF. BAxKR. 25 (1943), 22 NE. L. RZv. 134 (1943), 17 TEMP. L. Q. 461 (1943),
29 VA. L. REv. 1067 (1943).
20. 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943).
21. Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 437 (1943)
(emphasis added).
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prevail, however, by taking additional steps against the obligor, such as
securing a judgment or effecting a novation. 22 The court, literally applying
both the K/auder dictum and Section 60, reasoned that it was still theoreti-
cally possible for a subsequent bona fide purchaser to prevail over the initial
assignee; accordingly, the transfer was held not fully perfected before bank-
ruptcy intervened.
The Xlauder decision does little more than spell out the existing law of
preferences in a factual context..23 Local law required that the transfer be
accorded certain publicity. The creditor failed to divulge his interest in the
debtor's estate and consequently became a secret lienor obnoxious to Section
60. Unfortunately In re Vardaman was not appealed; 2 4 it has, however,
been justly condemned. 25 Not only did the assignee comply with local pub-
licity requirements, but the transfer, itself, under applicable law, was fully
perfected at the time of execution. That the creditor's claim was subject to
possible future divestment upon the occurrence of certain conditions was
22. The "'fassachusetts rule" applied by the court has been codified by the American
Law Institute:
"Any assignee who purchases his assignment for value in good faith without
notice of a prior assignment, and who obtains
(i) payment or satisfaction of the obligor's duty, or
(ii) judgment against the obligor, or
(iii) a new contract with the obligor by means of a novation, or
(iv) delivery of a tangible token or writing, surrender of which is required of the
obligor's contract for its enforcement,
can retain any performance so received and can enforce any judgment or novation so
acquired, and, if he has obtained a token or writing as stated in subelause (iv), can
enforce against the obligor the assigned right... :' RxsrATa=mr, Co,.nAcrs
§173 (b) (1932).
Faced with a conflict of laws problem, the court avoided determining whether the Mas-
sachusetts rule or that used in the Klauder case applied by holding that the trustee could
recover under either. In addition, therefore, to the fact that the case was never appealed
and that its interpretation was misguided, the Vardaman rule may also be attacked as
dictum.
23. For approval of the Klauder decision see Oglebay, supra note 1, at 55, 56; 3
Co.umR, BANKRUPTCY 71, 72 (1946 Supp.). Professor Glenn anticipated the application
of § 60 to accounts receivable assignments in this manner. 2 GLr. , FnAu'uam-T CON-
vEYAxcEs AD PrEFEPsxcEs § 534. But see Cohen and Gerber, Mortgages of Accounts
Receivable, 29 GEo. L. J. 555, 572-3 (1941) ; Hamilton, The Effect of Section Sixty of the
Bankruptcy Act upon Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 26 VA. L. REv. 163 (1939);
Neuhoff, Assignment of Accounts Receivable as Affected by the Chandler Act, 34 Ir.. L.
REv. 538 (1940). Professor McLaughlin, a supporter of the proposed amendment, admits
that "tithe decision upon the facts can scarcely be attacked-as without reasonable basis.
. . " McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HAnv. L. R-v. 233, 243
(1946).
24. Apparently, the proceedings were not even contested. The matter soon became
moot; the bankrupt was shortly reorganized. Brief for Appellees, p. 23, In re Rosen, 157
F.2d 997 (C.C.AL 3d 1946).
25. Kupfer and Livingston, supra note 19, at 916-9; McLaughlin, supra note 23, at
249-50; Oglebay, supra note 1, at 56. But see Snedeker, Security Devices and Sec. 60A of
the Chandler Act, 22 Osu. L. REV. 307,314-7 (1943).
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immaterial. Section 60 measures the trustee's voidability powers with a
bona fide purchaser test of perfection; it does not grant him the retroactive
status 21 of a bona fide purchaser, who by subsequent further action might
prevail over the transferee's interests.27
Criticisms of Section Sixty of the Chandler Act
The Klauder and Vardaman decisions are said to epitomize the two funda-
mental evils flowing from Section 60's present form. Even critics who con-
cede that In re Vardaman may be atypical complain that many types of
security transactions and commercial practices, hitherto commonly ac-
cepted and employed, are now threatened with invalidation by the debtor's
bankruptcy. 2 In addition, they doubt the underlying wisdom of the bona
fide purchaser test of perfection in measuring the trustee's powers to avoid
preferences.
26. Most commentators support this proposition. See, e.g., 3 Couaan, BANICRUP=r
917-20; 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PFRENCES § 488; Glenn, The
Chandler Act and the Trustee as a Rona Fide Purchaser: A Supplementary Note, 25 VA.
L. REv. 885 (1939) ; Oglebay, supra note 1, at 58. All three cite the equity of a vendor
who may rescind because of the bankrupt's fraud as a sample third party right, previously
recognized as a matter of course in bankruptcy, which would be cut off by giving the
trustee the status of a bona fide purchaser.
27. In the Klauder situation, to prevail, a subsequent bona fide purchaser would also
have had to take further action, i.e., notify the account-debtor of the assignment, in order
to acquire a superior right in the assigned accounts. 'Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems
under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 Co. L. REv. 58, 71 (1943). But, unlike
the Vardaman situation, see note 22 supra, "[t]he act that the bona fide purchaser had to
do after his purchase in order to prevail was the simple, easy one of giving notice. This
did not require litigation, or even the consent or acquiescence of any third party, and thus
might be described as a natural incident or corollary of the standing of the hypothetical
second assignee as a bona fide purchaser." McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bank-
ruptcy, 60 HARv. L. REv. 233, 249 (1946). Moreover, under law applicable in the Klander
case the assignment to the preferred creditor was not perfected until notification. But see
Martin, Substantive Regulation of Security Devices Under the Bankruptcy Power, 48
COL L. REv. 62, 64-5 (1948).
28. "Such drastic treatment of a firmly established business practice (assignment of
accounts receivable) has no relation at all to the legitimate purposes of a preference stat-
ute." Ireton, supra note 4, at 264. McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60
HARv. L. REv. 233, 251 (1946). Oglebay treats this objection none too kindly. Oglebay,
supra note 1, at 59. See also 3 CoLLrER, BANRUPTCY 916.
Some commentators predicted an immediate curtailment of accounts receivable financ-
ing as a direct result of the Klauder decision. McLaughlin, supra, at 251; Snedeker, Secur-
ity Devices under Sec. 60A of the Chandler Act, 22 ORE. L. Rnv. 307, 317 (1943). However,
replies to a questionnaire distributed by the American Bankers Association indicate that
employment of this security device has multiplied as a direct result of legislation compel-
ling its public recordation, although the notoriety thereby achieved would seem to be
greater than that attending application of the rule which controlled the Klauder decision.
LEGAL D-PT., AmER. BANKERS Ass'N, REPORTS ON OPERATION oF FILING STATUTES IN
CALFONuIL AND MissouRi 3 (January, 1947). Thomas B. Paton, Assistant General Coun-
sel of the Association, stated: "It is my opinion that recordation legislation which brings
[Vol. 57: 828
1948] PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION SIXTY 835
Section 60 was specifically recast in order to force the commercial world
to alter several security transactions long judicially supported.2 It may be
urged that the practically mandatory requirement that public notice be
given of the nature and extent of the debtor's borrowing injures the latter's
credit standing and militates against his securing the additional funds neces-
sary to prolongation of the business." But "to refrain from giving notice, in
order . . . not to hurt the debtor's credit . . . is to urge the very fraud
which is aimed at by all the rules protecting creditors against sccret liens." 31
With greater force, critics point out that literal interpretation of the pres-
ent statutory language menaces certain types of security transactions which
are not fully perfectible against bona fide purchasers, despite compliance
with local recordation statutes. 32 Literal application of Section 60 would
also categorize any transfer not perfected with precise simultaneity into one
for an antecedent debt.. 3 But fear resulting from attenuated logic hardly
warrants substantial weakening of an effective statute. Certainly the credi-
tor who fully obeys local law by providing the world with notice of his inter-
est in the debtor's property is not the person against whom Section 60 is
aimed. Equally, where perfection is completed with reasonable promptness,
accounts receivable financing out in the open naturally has a wholesome effect upon the
whole business and this non-secret lien feature has drawn many banks into the field."
Communication to YALE LAw Jourax, January 15, 1948.
29. "You are going to have taken away some advantages that some people have
enjoyed, and certain practices are going to be altered to some extent. But you have
that every time you pass any kind of a commercial law." Statement by Professor Mc-
Laughlin, Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 125 (1937). "[F]or thirty-five years Congress has consistently reached out to strike
down secret transfers, and the courts have with equal consistency found its efforts faulty
or insufficient to that end. Against such a background, §60a -v.as drawn... ." Corn
Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 438-9 (1943).
30. See Comment, 44 YA.n L. J. 639 (1935), to the effect that secrecy is the essence
of successful operation of accounts receivable fipancing. The fear that the Klauder ded-
sion's requirement of publicity would kill accounts receivable financing has achieved no
factual support. See note 28 supra.
31. Comment, 41 MIcH. L. Rxv. 473,479 (1942).
32. Such "imperfectible transfers" include the chattel mortgage of a stock in trade,
the conditional sale for resale, the trust receipt, and the factor's lien, all discussed irfra pp.
850-3. See Hanna, Some Unsolved Problens Under Section 60A of the Banbruptcy Act,
43 CoT. L. REv. 58, 73 (1943) ; Ireton, supra note 1, at 263-5; Keeffe, Kelly, and Lewis,
supra note 4, at 100-3; Foreword by Hanna to Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receiv-
able, 33 CALIn. L. Rnv. 40, 43-4 (1945); McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Barh-
ruptcy, 60 HARv. L. Rav. 233, 251 (1946). But see Oglebay, stpra note 1, at 59.
33. For example, a chattel mortgage executed for an adequate consideration but un-
recorded until the following day, would be deemed "made" on the date of recordation and
so would become a transfer for the antecedent debt incurred the day before. This result is
envisaged by Ireton, supra note 4, at 262, 271, and by Keeffe, Kelly, and Lewis, supra note
4, at 105. Section 60a (3) I and II of the proposed amendment, sufra note 12, would
avert this danger by providing for a limited period, not to exceed thirty days, during vhich
subsequent perfection of the transfer would relate back to the date of execution.
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fairness compels that the process be regarded as a continuous transaction
"made" at the time of actual execution. 34
In addition to criticism leveled at the application of Section 60 to particu-
lar types of security transactions, the over-all allegation is made that the
trustee's powers therein conferred are disproportionate to the function he
performs in avoiding preferential transfers. Would-be amenders assert that
the retroactive test should not permit the trustee to accomplish that which
individual creditors, acting alone, could not achieve. Where local law per-
mits certain types of "secret" transfers as against the transferror's general
creditors, it is argued that such transactions should not be invalidated by
the trustee, who, after all, acts only in behalf of these very same creditors."5
The radically changed situation represented by the debtor's bankruptcy
is totally overlooked by this argument. 3 In a struggle between an individual
34. Assuredly the purposes of § 60 are not served by turning security transactions into
foot races. See 3 Cotuan, BANKRUPTCY 912 n.4 1; Oglebay, supra note 1, at 56 n.37;
Note, 10 U. oF C. L. Rnv. 220, 223-4 and n.16 (1943). As pointed out by these com-
mentators, the doctrine of "continuous transaction" is scarcely foreign to bankruptcy. In
re Coombs, 37 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Mo. 1940); In re McManus Motors, 27 F. Supp. 113
(D. Mass. 1939); cf. Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co., 37 Cal. App.2d 439, 99 P2d
1083 (1940). In In re E. H. Webb Grocery Co., 32,F. Supp. 3 (M.D. Tenn. 1940), a chat-
tel mortgage executed on Sept. 15, 1938, was recorded on Sept. 16, 1938; the date of bank-
ruptcy was Jan. 16, 1939. The continuous transaction rationale rather than the fallacious
"antecedent debt" interpretation, discussed note 16 supra, would have supported the court's
holding.
Whether the transaction involved is continuous depends on the particular facts. Na-
tional City Bank of New York v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50, 58 (1913). It would seem
preferable to leave the matter to the court's discretion, rather than to allow automatically
a thirty-day "relation-back" period in the manner provided by the proposed amendment,
note 12 supra. Tolerance of excusable delays does not necessitate light treatment of the
transferee who waits twenty-nine days to record in the local courthouse.
35. Ireton, supra note 4, at 261; Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems Under Section 60A
of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 CoL L. REv. 58, 61 (1943) ; Foreword by Hanna to Koessler,
supra note 32, at 44; McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L, RuV.
233, 253-5 (1946); American Bar Association, Section on Corporation, Banking and
Mercantile Law, 1 Bus. LAw., No. 1, pp. 10-11 (1946).
The desire for limitation of this type is not new. See Curtis, The Position of a Trustee
in Bankruptcy with Reference to Invalid Transfers or Liens, 5 CoL. L. REv. 584, 590
(1905). Professor McLaughlin, in 1927, suggested an amendment to § 60, to provide that
"no transfer shall be regarded as made until such steps are taken as are necessary to
make it valid against creditors of the sort whose rights, remedies and powers are vested
in the trustee by . . . Section 47a (2) [now 70c]." McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REv. 341, 390 (1927). By 1938, he was supporting the bona fide
purchaser test, however. See note 10 supra. Professdr McLaughlin has changed his mind
once more, for he is an ardent advocate of the proposed amendment. McLaughlin, Dcfin-
ing a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L. REv. 233, 245 (1946). He explains that the
present § 60 was an "experiment" thought necessary to overcome strict judicial construc-
tion in the past. "Fears that such legislation might go too far were quieted by contempla-
tion of what was deemed to be the established tradition of strict construction." Ibid.
36. Accepting the rationale of this argument, the "logical" conclusion would seem to
be that § 60, in itself, is an anomaly, since at common law the preference is perfectly per-
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creditor and the holder of a secret lien, it is well within the province of local
law to control the equities; both are contestants in the race of diligence and
the victory or defeat of either affects none but the participants. But bank-
ruptcy substitutes for the race of diligence achievement of its own objective
-preservation of the estate, during the period of insolvency preceding bank-
ruptcy, for equitable distribution to all creditors. The secret transfer, re-
gardiless of its validity apart from bankruptcy, is inimical to this purpose.
If such a transaction, unpublicized until immediately before bankruptcy, is
subsequently validated as against the trustee, there is a real diminution of
the assets upon which other creditors have relied in dealing with the debtor
and in refraining from prosecuting claims to judgment.Y
The Proposed Amendment
After nearly half a century's struggle to enable the trustee to strike effec-
tively at the secret lien, it is now proposed to amend Section 60 by providing:
"[A] transfer shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at the
time when it became so far perfected that no creditor obtaining
under applicable law by legal or equitable proceedings . . .a lien
on such property . .. could acquire, after such perfection, any
rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the
transferee therein . . . " 33
In short, a transfer to be deemed "made" would need be perfected only
against subsequent lien creditors, instead of bona fide purchasers.
II. PERFECTION OF A TRANSFER UNDER SECTION SLXTY: Tim LAw Now
AND THE PROPOSED AmENDMENT
To evaluate the success of the proposed amendment in countering the
alleged flaws in Section 60 and the cost at which this objective would be
achieved, it is necessary to consider the procedure required to "perfect" the
various major types of security transactions under the present and suggested
law of preferences.19
The Eguitable Lien
Before the Chandler Act, it was possible to validate virtually every trans-
fer of the debtor's property made shortly prior to bankruptcy by finding a
missible; it is invalid only by statute. 1 GLmn, FRAuDuLaNT Col -y'Az;cns Aim Pnmnn-
ENcEs §289. To permit the trustee to invalidate any preference allows him to accomplish
that which individual creditors, acting alone, could not themselves achieve.
37. Professor Hanna insists that creditors rely not on the debtor's ostensible assets
but rather on his financial statements and credit-rating. Hanna, Some U sohcd Problcmw
wzder Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 CO. L. Rsv. 58, 69-70 (1943). But see note
92 infra.
38. H. R. 2412, S. 826, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). For the full text of the amend-
ment, see note 12 supra.
39. See 3 COL.UEm, BANKRUPTCY 920-84 for extensive treatment of the perfection of
various types of security transactions before 1938 and under the present law.
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previously made bona fide agreement to create or give security. Equity,
under such circumstances, creates a charge upon the property so affected,' 0
which is binding upon the parties, and, some times, even against third per-
sons. Until 1938, performance of the act necessary legally to perfect the
equitable lien, i.e., recordation or possession of the res, uniformly was held
to "relate back" to the execution of the initial agreement. Unless the orig-
inal agreement constituted a preference, the transfer was not voidable by
the trustee, even though it might not have been publicly disclosed until
immediately before bankruptcy. 41
As between innocent general creditors and an individual lienor who nor-
mally is entitled to specific performance of the promise upon which he has
relied, the latter must yield in bankruptcy. 42 The perfection test prescribed
by the Chandler Act prohibits the application of the equitable lien against
the trustee, 4 since the equitable rights flowing from an agreement to give
security are always subject to divestment by a bona fide purchaser. 4 The
40. Although rarely so discussed, the lien apparently stems from the equitable notion
of unjust enrichment to the borrower at the expense of the creditor who has advanced
money or otherwise acted in reliance. The doctrine theoretically operates only when the
court discovers an intent by the parties to create a charge supported by adequate consid-
eration, on specifically identifiable property. More realistically, allowance of the lien
"turns on delicate appraisals of facts and upon the deciding authority's sense of justice,"
Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of the Problem, 8 N. C. L. REV. 388, 394
(1930). For general discussion of the equitable lien see JONES, LIENs §§ 27-96 (1914) ;
LAwREucz, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 209, 234-44 (1929) (equitable assignments) ; Mc-
CLINTOCI, EQUITY §§ 114-7 (1936); POMEROY, EQUITY §§ 165, 1233 et seq. (5th ed.,
Symons, 1941) ; RESTATEMENT, REITUrUTION § 161 (1937). For equitable mortgages see
WALSH, EQUITY 129 (1930); WnLTsm, MORTGAGES §§32-38 (1939); Walsh, Equitable
Mortgages, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. 429 (1932) ; Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York,
20 Co. L. REv. 519 (1920). For equitable pledges see 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoNMv-
AMCEs AND PREFERENCES §§ 292 et seq., 481 ; RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 10 and pp. 30-2
(1941).
41. Typical was the leading case of Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
An unrecorded agreement by the bankrupt to pledge securities was held to have created
an equitable lien in favor of the pledgee; delivery of the securities within four months
before bankruptcy "related back" to the date of the original agreement and did not con-
stitute a preferential transfer.
For general discussion of the equitable lien in bankruptcy, see Britton, supra note 40;
3 Couaaa, BANKRUPTCY 875-91, 975-82; Glenn, The Equitable Pledge, Creditors' Rights
and the Chandler Act, 25 VA. L. REv. 422 (1939) ; Horack, Insolvency and Spceific Per-
formance, 31 H~Av. L. REv. 702 (1918); McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy
Act, 40 HARv. L. REv. 341, 383-91 (1927); Comment, 34 YALE L. J. 891 (1925) ; Notes,
37 COL. L. REv. 621 (1937), 24 COL. L. REv. 68 (1924), 12 MINN. L. Rnv. 378 (1928).
42. Note, however, that the equitable lien by definition is never perfected.
43. The draftsmen of the Chandler Act left small doubt of their intention to stamp
out the doctrine's application in bankruptcy. Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on
H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 122-3 (1937); H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 30 (1937) ; McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HaM. L. Rv.
233, 245 (1946). See Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S.
434,438 (1943).
44. PomERoy, EQUITY §§743, 766; RESTATEMENr, RESTIrUTION §172 (1937).
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equitable Iienor, to be protected against his debtor's insolvency, must now
immediately publicize the nature of his interest in the latter's property, in-
stead of delaying legal perfection until bankruptcy appears imminent."
The proposed amendment would revive the "relation back" doctrine and
the consequent protection of the equitable lien against the trustee," at least
to the extent that it is preferred by local law over the claims of lien creditors.
The exact magnitude of the change depends upon an analysis of the law in
forty-eight jurisdictions; the cases are many, however, where a judgment or
attachment creditor is said to acquire an interest in the debtor's property
no greater than that possessed by the debtor himself at the time of levy,
and must yield, therefore, to a prior equitable lienor.tm The history of Sec-
45. Matter of Seim Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 855 (D.Md. 1941). For excellent
evaluation and correct application of the policy of § 60, see Gins v. faurer Plumbing
Supply Co., 148 F-2d 974 (C.C.A. 2d. 1945). There an agreement to pledge was
held to create an equitable pledge; however, since the chattel rested in the hands of a
prior pledgee, creditors were not deceived by the debtor's visible assets. The transfer
was accordingly held "made" on the date of the original agreement. Contra: Associated
Seed Growers v. Geib, 125 F2d 683 (C.C.A. 4th 1942), reversing Matter of Talbot
Canning Co., 35 F. Supp. 680 (D. Mfd. 1940); Matter of Lion Overall Co., 48 F. Supp.
442 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). In view of the Klauder decision, these latter two cases can no
longer be considered good law; the courts in both relied upon Union Trust Co. of Md.
v. Townshend, 101 F2d 903 (C.C.A. 4th 1939), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 646 (1939), which
applying the pre-1938 law, validated an equitable lien as of the date of the original agree-
ment, and were cited by Justice Roberts in his sole dissent in the Klaudcr case, 318 U.S.
434, 441-2 (1943). But see Matter of Soss, 52 F. Supp. 123, 125 (D. Del. 1943), decided
one half a year after the Klauder case. There, the court apparently missed completely
the change wrought by the 1938 amendment, saying that taking of possession under a
valid equitable lien relates back to the date of the original agreement between the parties
for purposes of § 60.
46. This result, of course, is the major defect in the proposed amendment and has
been criticized by Oglebay, supra note 1, at 58-9 and Keeffe, Kelly and Lewis, stpra note
4, at 106-9. To remedy the defect, the last named writers suggest that there be inserted
in subsection (2) of the proposed bill, supra note 12, a proviso: "for the purposes of this
section such a creditor shall be deemed to have an interest superior to that of any equitable
lienor." Besides offering to the courts the obvious out of designating the "equitable
lienor" by some other appellation, the proposed amendment, as modified by this suggestion,
would still strike down the Klaudcr result as applied to accounts receivable assignments
and protect the pledgee who has permitted the pledgor to retain temporary possession.
See pp. 852-3 infra. Professor Hanna defends this effect of the proposed amendment: "If
a state believes that certain equitable interest, specially in respect of land, should prevail
over judgment creditors, that . . . is the business of the state." Hanna, Preferences in
Bankruptcy, 15 U. oF CHi. L. R v. 311, 331 (1948).
47. Equitable lien good against lien of judgment creditors: Union National Bank
of Wilmington v. Topkis Bros. Co., 23 Del. Ch. 59, 2 A.2d 148 (Ch. 1938); Royal In-
surance Co. v. Simon, 20 Del. Ch. 297, 174 AUt. 444 (Ch. 1934); Union Trust Co. v.
Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 AUt. 509 (1927) ; Smithhurst v. Edmunds, 14 N. J. Eq. 408 (1862) ;
Dwight v. Newell, 3 N.Y. 185 (1865); Dufur Oil Co. v. Enos, 59 Ore. 528, 117 Pae.
457 (1911) ; Charlottesville Hardware Co. v. Perkins, 118 Va. 34,86 S.E. 869 (1915).
Equitable lien good against lien of attachment creditors: Inderrieden Co. v. Allen,
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tion 70(c) 4s confirms the fear that the proposed amendment would greatly
curtail the trustee's power under Section 60; before the Chandler Act went
into effect, there were many instances where the trustee's statutory position
under Section 70(c) as a lien creditor, with respect to defending the debtor's
property at the time of bankruptcy, was not sufficient to defeat the claims
of an equitable lienor against the estate.4 9
Conveyances of Real Property and the Chattel Mortgage
The Klauder decision makes clear that, under the Chandler Act, no con-
veyance of real property or chattel mortgage is "made" until the transferee
has fully perfected his interest against the entire world by either possession
or recordation.60 The proposed amendment preserves the bona fide pur-
chaser test of perfection so far as real property transfers are concerned;"1
176 Ill. App. 301 (1st Dist. 1913) ; City National Bank of Marshalltown v. Crahan, 135
Iowa 230, 112 N.W. 793 (1907) ; Johnson v. Darr, 114 Tex. 516, 272 S.W. 1098 (1925).
Equitable lien good against receiver or assignee for benefit of creditors: Burrowes v.
Nimocks, 35 F.2d 152 (C.C.A. 4th 1929) ; McFerran v. Louisville Title Co.'s Receiver, 254
Ky. 362, 71 S.W.2d 655 (1934); Klaustermeyer v. Cleveland Trust Co., 89 Ohio St.
142, 105 N.E. 278 (1913).
Equitable mortgage arising from mortgage agreement not complying with legal re-
quirements good against lien creditors of mortgagor: Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 97 Kan.
408, 155 Pac. 791 (1916) ; Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98 Atl. 42 (1916) - Ruther-
ford National Bank v. H. R. Bogle and Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 571, 169 Atl. 180 (Ch. 1933);
Robinson v. Williams, 22 N.Y. 380 (1860). See also 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENTr CONVEYANcM
AND PREFERENCES §§ 19, 151; RESTATEmENT, RarTnuTrION § 161, comment c (1937).
48. Until 1938, what is now § 70(c) was § 47(a). 36 STAT. 838 (1910).
49. Eg., Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., 101 F.2d 765 (C.C.A. 10th 1938),
cert. denied, 307 U.S. 640 (1939) ; Tobin v. Insurance Agency Co., 80 F.2d 241 (C.C.A.
8th 1935); Del Rio Bank & Trust v. Cornell, 57 F.2d 142 (C.C.A. 5th 1932) ; In re
Miller-Rose Co., 36 F.2d 203 (C.C.A. 7th 1929); Beacon Trust Co. v. Dolan, 27 F.2d
247 (C.C.A. 1st 1928); In re Dier, 296 Fed. 816 (C.C.A. 3d 1924), cert. denied, 265 U.S.
584 (1923); Hopkins v. National Shawmut Bank, 293 Fed. 884 (C.C.A. 5th 1923),
cert. denied, 263 U.S. 722 (1921); Lewin v. Telluride Iron Works Co., 272 Fed. 590
(C.C.A. 8th 1921); In re Hollins, 215 Fed. 41 (C.C.A. 2d 1914); T re Plantations Co,
270 Fed. 273 (E.D. Pa. 1921); Gage Lumber Co. v. McEldowney, 207 Fed. 255 (C.C.A,
6th 1913); Barker Piano Co. v. Commercial Security Co., 93 Conn. 129, 105 At. 328
(1918); Schoenherr v. Van Meter, 218 N.Y. 548, 109 N.E. 625 (1915).
50. Matter of Cox, 132 F.2d 881 (C.C.A. 7th 1943) (unrecorded real property mort-
gage) ; In re Greenberg, 48 F. Supp. 3 (D. Mass. 1942) (unrecorded Chattel mortgage).
But cf. Adams v. City National Bank, 115 F.2d 453 (C.C.A 5th 1940) (discussed supra
note 16). Before 1938, the trustee could not move against real property conveyances and
chattel mortgages belatedly perfected if local recordation statutes protected only the
debtor's lien creditors and bona fide purchasers. Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916).
51. Section 60a (2), H. R. 2412, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., note 12 .rupra.
As Oglebay, supra note 1, at 58, points out, the earlier drafts of the proposed amend-
ment did not include this exception. Manifestly inconsistent with the theory of the amend-
ment as a whole, it was evidently added to avoid revival of the rule of Carey v. Donohue,
240 U.S. 430 (1916). Ireton, supra note 4, at 270-1; McLaughlin, Defining a Preference
it Bankruptcy, 60 HA.v. L. 1kv. 233, 255 (1946). In Carey v. Donohue, sujpra, the
trustee could not avoid a real property conveyance belatedly recorded where local leg-
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since all jurisdictions invalidate unrecorded chattel mortgages as against
lien creditors, 52 the amendment's adoption would not change the current law
with respect to these two types of transfers.
The Conditional Sale
Before 1938, a preference was defined in part as a "transfer . of any
of . . . [the debtor's] property . . . to anyone of his creditors. . ." "
In Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co.,54 in 1915, the Supreme Court pointed
out that a conditional sale passes title only upon complete performance of
the contractual terms; Is accordingly, the Court reasoned, goods condition-
ally sold to the debtor were not his "property" and so could not be prefer-
entially transferred by subsequent recordation or repossession." Conceptu-
alism thus permitted a conditional vendor to recover his goods despite the
losses caused other creditors by the vendor's failure to record or otherwise
give notice of the specious nature of the debtor's apparent rights in the
property.'
islation invalidated unregistered conveyances only against bona fide purchasers. There
are eighteen jurisdictions with such statutes today: CAL. Cn'xL Coan § 1214 (Deering,
1941); D=.. REv. CoDE §3680 (1935); GA. CoDE Ax.n. §§29-401, 67-&9 (1933);
IDAHO CoDE A.Nx. § 54-812 (1932); Inn. STAT. A,.n. § 56-119 (Burns, 1933);
IOWA CODE §558.41 (1946); MicH. STAT. A'N. §26-547 (Henderson, 1937);
MoxT. REv. CODE ANN. §6935 (1935); NEa. REv. STAT. §76-233 (1943); Nayv.
Coiw. LAws § 1498 (1931-1941 Supp.); N.Y. Rw. Pnor. LAw §291 (Mclinney, 1945);
Onto GEN. CoDE § 8572-31 (Page, 1938) ; OE.A. STAT. Am;., tit. 16, § 15 (1937) ; S. D.
CODE § 51.1620 (1939); UTAH CODE AmN. § 78-3-3 (1943); WAsn. RMy. STAT. Ann.
§ 10596-2 (Remington, 1933); Wis. STAT. § 235.49 (1945); Wyo. Co-m. SrAT. ANN.
§66-119 (1945). See generally: GLENN, MoRGAGES §§368, 576 (8th ed., 1923);
1 WILTSIE, MORTGAGES §§ 262, 266 (Fribourg and Elting, 5th ed. 1939); Note, 13 Com.
L. REV. 539 (1913).
This sole retention of the bona fide purchaser test in the proposed amendment "proves
either (1) that the general theory is incorrect, or (2) that it is correct save as to real
property transfers, i.e., that the only case where Congress can and ought to change
property rights fixed by the state is the case of an unrecorded realty transfer for an
antecedent debt where by local law such transfer could not be successfully attacked by a
lien creditor, or (3) that the exception should not be made." Martin, Substantive Rcgzda-
tion of Security Devices under the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Co. L. Ray. 62, 69 (1948).
52. NATiONAL CoNFEaRncE op CoanussioNEas o Unonm' STAT LAWS, REPo= o.0
UnRoms CHAT MORTGAGE AcT 13-9 (1923) ; Legis., 19 VA. L. Iv. 635, 637 (1933)
(statutory summary). See UxNioRm CHATm MOMAGE Acr § 5.
53. 44 STAT. 666 (1926).
54. 239 U.S. 268 (1915).
55. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S. 268, 274 (1915). See Esancuc, In-
sTzA-.Lm- SALys §§ 480, 507 (1926); 3 Jonas, CHATTL MORGAGES AnD Co:mmro..AL
SAtLs § 1140 (1933).
56. The Bailey case dealt with a belatedly recorded transfer. That repossession by
the conditional vendor at any time before bankruptcy did not constitute a voidable prefer-
ence, see In re Johnson, 282 Fed. 273 (N.D. Iowa 1922).
57. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 5, which invalidates an unfiled conditional
sale as to purchasers from the buyer and his lien creditors, has been adopted by the follow-
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In the hearings on the Chandler Act, there was little doubt that the re-
vamped statute would terminate the immunity of unrecorded conditional
sales contracts.5 s Indeed, the Bailey case was explicitly mentioned as one
of the major decisions sought to be "overruled."69
In the drafting process, however, the Bailey problem was apparently over-
looked. Nowhere in the statute is there specific provision for the conditional
sale and perhaps in consequence, there has been no challenge since 1938 of
the Bailey rule. The Chandler Act's catch-all definition of a "transfer" may,
however, be sufficiently broad to bring the conditional sale fortuitously
within the orbit of Section 60. A transfer now includes:
". .. the sale and every other and different mode, direct or in-
direct, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest
therein . . .absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involunta-
rily (by any means whatsoever) . . ." 60
Before recordation of a conditional sale or repossession thereunder, the
vendee has the legal power of transferring perfect title to a bona fide pur-
chaser or mortgagee."1 Since either recordation or repossession by the con-
ditional vendor divests the debtor of this legal power and simultaneously
perfects the former's security interest,62 the argument is tenable that an
"interest" passes and, accordingly, a "transfer" is effected within the mean-
ing of Section 60.65
ing jurisdictions: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin. 2 U. L. A. 6
(1946 Supp.). Twenty-two states have similar statutory requirements: Alabama, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Georgia, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming. Absent recording acts, a conditional sale
generally is good against bona fide purchasers from the vendee and his creditors. See
1 WIInIsToN, SALEs § 327 (1924).
Without this conceptualistic difficulty, the trustee nevertheless could not move against
belatedly recorded transaction if the local statute, in the manner of the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act § 5, invalidated unrecorded conditional sales only as against the vendee's
lien creditors and bona fide purchasers. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U.S.
268,275-6 (1915).
58. 3 CoLLrER, BANKRUPTCY 941; McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to
Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. OF CHL L. Ray. 369, 393 and n. 120 (1937).
59. Hearings before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
124 (1937).
60. Section 1(30). That this section was redrafted in 1938 to effectuate the new
policy of § 60, see H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937) ; WMNsTEIN, TUE
BANKRuPTcY LAw o, 1938 7 (1938). But there is no evidence of intent to cover the
Bailey case specifically.
61. UNiroRm CONDITIONAL SALEs AcT § 5.
62. Ibid.
63. This rationale is supported by 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 942-3; Mulder, Ambigui-
ties it; the Chandler Act, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 10, 24 (1940) ; and Snedeker, Security De-
vices and Sec. 60A of the Chandler Act, 22 Oma. L. Rav. 307, 318 (1943). Note the
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The unrecorded conditional sale constitutes as iniquitous a secret lien as
the undisclosed chattel mortgage; neither satisfies the standard of publicity
essential to fair treatment of all creditors. Where bankruptcy condemns the
one as a preference, it should not tolerate the other because of casuistry
compounded by forgetfulness. Assuming that the conditional sale may, on
the above rationale, be numbered among those security transactions for
which Section 60 requires publicity, the proposed amendment would not
reduce the trustee's powers of avoidance in jurisdictions following the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act, for under that statute both bona fide purchasers




In the typical tripartite trust receipt arrangement, title to the goods passes
directly from the manufacturer or exporter to the banker-"entrustor" who
has advanced the purchase price; the latter releases the property by way of
bailment to the dealer-"trustee" who signs a trust receipt unconditionally
agreeing to repay the purchase price plus commission.0
Supreme Court's declaration that the draftsmen of § 60 in 1938 were "fully aware of the
vicissitudes of its predecessors," noting that in committee hearings, "disapproving refer-
ence was made to Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co... ." Corn Exchange National Bank
& Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 438 and n.11 (1943). That §60 cannot be used
to invalidate a belatedly filed conditional sale, see Foreword by Hanna to Koessler, As-
signrent of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALw. L. Rrv. 40, 45 (1945); Hanna, Some Un-
solved Problems Under Section 60,4 of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 COL. L. REv. 58, 63
(1945) (but repossession within four months is a voidable preference); 2 GLtmu;, FnAu-
DULENT Co=vnYANcEs AND PaREMM'NCES § 518 (not even repossession within four months
is a preferencey; Glenn, The Conditional Sale at Common Law, 25 VA. L. Rnv. 559, 585
(1939) ; Note, 28 VA. L. REv. 395, 402 (1942) (". . . it may be presumed that such con-
tracts are without the scope of this section of the Act.'). "Can it be said that the loss of a
power to do an illegal act is a transfer within the meaning of Section 1 (30) ?" Hanna,
Some Unsolved Problems under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 CoL L REV. 58,
68 (1943).
Professor Hanna suggests that Section 1 (30) "be amended to include in the cate-
gory of transfers 'record of any transfer'." Foreword by Hanna to Koessler, srrpra, at
45. But this would not supply the interest in the debtor's ouwn property now said to be
lacking in both the conditional sale and the trust receipt, discussed pp. 841-2 infra.
64. UNIOoRm CONDrrIONAL SAms Acr § S (adopted by ten states, with twenty-two
other states having statutes similar in this respect). See note 52 supra. See Able,
Conditional Sellers, Hostile Claimnnts and the Filing Period, 47 NV. VA. L. Q. 73 (1941).
The suggested lien creditor test would perhaps threaten the trustees powers in states
where case-made law only invalidates the conditional sale as to certain classes of third
parties. 1 Wm.LIsrox, SALEs §§ 325-6 (1923) lists Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana and
Michigan, which by judicial fiat have brought the conditional sale within other recording
acts or otherwise invalidated it against bona fide purchasers. It is possible under these
circumstances for the conditional sale to be void against bona fide purchasers, but .alid
against the vendee's lien creditors, hence beyond reach of the trustee under the preposed
amendment. Compare Praeger v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 122 Md. 303,
89 AUt. 501 (1914) with Lincoln v. Quynn, 68 lid. 299, 11 Adt. 848 (188). Maryland
now requires recordation against both bona fide purchasers and lien creditors. Mn. Am.
Coon, Art. 21, § 71 (Flack, 1939).
65. See, generally, 9 U.L.A. 665-71 (1940) (Commissioners' Prefatory Note to
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The same difficulty over definition of the term "interest" discussed in con-
nection with the conditional sale applies to the trust receipt. Yet, so far as
the policy of Section 60 is concerned, there is no distinction between the
secretly executed trust receipt and the unrecorded conditional sale or chattel
mortgage in those jurisdictions which compel the public registration of all
three transactions." The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, adopted by twenty-
one states,6' requires the filing of a statement of the trust receipt within
thirty days for protection against lien creditors of the dealer-trustee ;3 re-
possession has the same effect as filing. 9 Following the rationale employed
with respect to the conditional sale, it would seem that perfection of the
creditor's security either by repossession or recordation may today constitute
a "transfer" of an interest in the debtor's property, voidable if the elements
required by Section 60 were present at that time?0
The proposed amendment does not appear to curtail the trustee's power
with respect to the trust receipt which is not perfected by repossession or
recordation until within four months before bankruptcy. The lien creditor
is expressly protected from secretly executed trust receipts by the Uniform
Act.7 1
The Bailment and Consignment
Unlike the conditional sale and the trust receipt, the bailment does not
contemplate an absolute obligation by the bailee to pay for the goods de-
livered. A bailment is merely a delivery of goods for a temporary and limited
purpose, ultimate control and title remaining in the bailor; 7 2 a' consignment
Uniform Trust Receipts Act); 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREVERERNCS
§§556-64; VOLD, SALES §§111-8 (1931); 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§338, 338a; Bogert,
The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act, 3 U. OF CHI. L. Rnv. 26 (1936); Frederick, The
Trust Receipt as Security, 22 COL. L. REv. 395, 546 (1922) ; Hanna, Trust Receipts, 19
CALIF. L. Rxv. 257 (1931) (disapproves of recording statutes); Stone, The "Equitable
Mortgage" in New York, 20 COL. L. REv. 519, 533 (1920). For the trust receipt in
bankruptcy, see 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 953-8;, Comment, 45 YALEi L. J. 1272 (1936);
Note, 26 CoRN. L. Q. 306 (1941); Legis., 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 270 (1934) (Uniform
Trust Receipts Act).
66. Note, however, Professor Hanna's firm assertion that the "inherent nature" of
the trust receipt places it beyond the legitimate field of recording acts. Hanna, Exten-
sion of Public Recordaion, 31 COL. L. REv. 617, 633-5 (1931).
67. California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington. 9 U. L. A.
123 (1946 Supp.).
68. UN ooRm TRUST RECEIPTs AcT § 8
69. UN rFu TRUST REcm-is ACT § 7.
70. The only case in point held that repossession within four months before bank-
ruptcy did not constitute a preference, since title remained in the entrustor. Walton v.
Commercial Credit Co., 69 S.D. 263, 267, 9 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1943). South Dakota,
however, had not at the time, adopted the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
71. UNiFoR TRUST RECEnrs AcT § 7.
72. BAYS, BAIL.ENTS, SHIPMENT AND SALE or PERSONAL PROPERTY § 58 (1935)
3 JONES, CHATTL MORTGAAGES § 972 (1933).
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is a bailment for sale to the consuming public.78 Since there is no debtor-
creditor relation, essential to the present statutory definition of a voidable
preference, 4 it has been uniformly held that the trustee cannot invalidate a
bailment or consignment regardless of the applicability of local recording
statutes.
75
In those jurisdictions which have modified the common law validity of
the bailment against third parties by bringing it within the scope of the re-
cording acts,76 the unpublicized bailment, like other secret liens, should seem-
ingly fall within the purview of Section 60. To continue the present immun-
ity invites the casting of other security transactions in bailment form in
order to escape condemnation as preferential transfers. The proposed amend-
ment, by changing the perfection test, obviously does not remedy the defect
here discussed. Revision of Section 60 specifically to include repossession
under an "unperfected" bailment or its belated recordation would seem
necessary.w
Assignment of Accounts Receivable
The assignment of accounts receivable presents an unusual publicity prob-
lem from the standpoint of Section 60. Until recently, creditors could learn
of their debtor's assignment, only indirectly through notification by the
assignee to the account obligor.n Yet in the typical transaction developed by
73. 1 GLE , FaUDULErNT CONVEYANCES AND PrERcCs §§535-6; 3 Jozs, CHAT-
Tm. MORTGAGES § 964.
74. "A preference is a transfer... to or for the benefit of a creditor .. by [a]
debtor . . ." Section 60.
75. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Cross, 17 F2d 417, (C.C.A. 4th 1927). See
cases cited, 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 949 n.13.
76. S. C. Civ. CODE §7047 (1942), specifically requires public recordation of bail-
ments. Other states, by judicial fiat, have brought the bailment within the scope of the
recording acts: Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee. See 6 C. J. 1105
§31, 8 C. J. S. 251 § 18 and cases cited. See 2A U. L. A. § 55 (1924).
Some southern states have Traders Acts which compel the public display of the legal
owner's name at the place of sale. Violation of the statute permits creditors of the bailee
to treat the property as the latter's own. MD. AiNN. CoDz, Art. 2, §§ 18, 20 (Flack, 1939) ;
Miss. CODE Amr. § 273 (1942) ; VA. CODE AaNr. § 5224 (Michie, 1942) ; IV. VA. Com
ANN. §4654 (Michie, 1943). 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoNVYAcNS AND Pn=rancas
§ 363.
77. The following inclusion, after the first sentence in § 60a is suggested: "Pro-
vided, however that a preference shall also include a transfer of any property held by the
bankrupt as a consigned bailee or lessee (or in any other capacity) for resale to the
consignor, bailor or lessor, with those consequences enumerated above." Section Cob
would also have to be amended to include "consignor, bailor or lessor" within the scope of
the word "creditor."
78. The court in the Klauder case realized that notification of the obligor would
scarcely warn all creditors, but viewed the establishment of so low a publicity standard
as irrelevant. Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 441
(1943). See Note, 10 U. oF Car L. REv. 220 (1943). But see Hanna, Some Unsoh'cd
Problems Under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 Cor-. L. REV. 58, 69-70 (1943).
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the commercial banks, the account debtor was not notified, the borrower-
assignor assuming the responsibility of collecting the sums due on the as-
signed accounts and applying the proceeds to the loan.79
In the absence of statutory regulation, three prevailing rules govern the
effect of non-notification on the rights of assignees of accounts receivable.10
Under Dearle v. Hall,81 establishing the English rule, a subsequent bona fide
purchaser who first gives notice to the account debtor prevails over a prior
but non-notifying assignee.82 Taking the opposite extreme, the New York
rule does not require notice in order to perfect the assignment; 83 a subse-
quent assignee, regardless of his good faith or lack of knowledge, is account-
able to the first assignee for all collections from the obligor.84 The Massa-
chusetts rule, followed by the federal courts s1 prior to Erie v. Tompkins 11
and approved by the American Law Institute," does not demand notifica-
79. Commercial banks, which had been seeking additional outlets for investment
capital, developed non-notification financing in the period after World War I, in order
to accommodate prospective borrowers who were unwilling to risk the publicity usually
attending factor financing. Non-notification financing now totals about $1,000,000,000
annually. SAULNIER AND JACOBY, ACCOUNTS RcEIvABLE FINANCING 3-4 (1943). See
also Comment, 44 YALE L. J. 639 (1935).
80. For discussion of the case-made law which governs in only nineteen jurisdictions,
see WILLISrON, CONTRACTS § 435 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; Brinck, Accounts Receivable as
Collateral, 11 WASH. L. Rxv. 134 (1936); Laucheimer, Some Problems of Modern Col-
lateral Banking, 26 COL. L. REv. 129 (1926); Miller, An Assignnwnt of Accounts Re-
ceivable as a Security Device, 22 MARQ. L. Ry. 28 (1937) ; Comment, 33 YALE L. J. 767
(1924) ; Note, 24 COL. L. REv. 501 (1924). For classification of the three rules according
to jurisdiction see AmmuCAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, ACCOUNTS RECEIVADLE: LISTS OF
STATES. (July, 1944) (most recent and exhaustive report); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF CREDr MEN, CREDIT MANUAL OF CoMMEicrAL LAWS 230-2 (1944); ROBERT Moius
AssocIATEs, BULLETIN 277-8 (1944) ; COMMTMrEE OF N.Y. BAR Ass'N., REPORT oN Um-
FoRm ST. LAWS 2-4 (1943); Notes, 31 A.L.R. 876 (1924), 110 A.L.R. 774 (1937).
81. 3 Russ. 1 (Ch. 1827). A leading United States case is 1) re Phillips' Estate,
205 Pa. 515, 55 Atl. 213 (1903). The English rule is still followed in Delaware (probably),
District of Columbia, Kansas (probably), Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee,
Vermont. AmEmicAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, ACCOUNTS RECEIvABLE: LiSTS or STATES
(1944).
82. The negligence of the first assignee in failing to notify the obligor is considered
so conducive to the assignor's fraud and misrepresentation that the assignee is estopped
from asserting his title. Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1 (Ch. 1827). See Crane, Recent Stahl-
tory Changes in the Law of Chattel Security, 8 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 104 (1942).
83. Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N.Y. 277, 41 N.E. 572 (1895). Only New York fol-
lows this rule. AMERICAN BANKERS ASs'N., ACCOUNTS REcEIVABLE : LISTS or STATES
(1944).
84. Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimtbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N.Y.S. 473 (1st
Dep't 1925).
85. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924). Comment,
33 YAlaE L. J. 767 (1924). See Notes, 13 CALIF. L. Rv. 141 (1925), 24 CoL. L. REv, 501
(1924).
86. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
87. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 173 (1932) ; note 22 supra. The Supreme Court in
the Salem case did not confine the exception to these situations specifically set out by
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tion in order to perfect the assignment but estops the first assignee from as-
serting his title under certain prescribed conditions.63
Although the draftsmen of the Chandler Act do not appear to have con-
sidered specifically the effect of the 1938 amendment upon assignments of
accounts receivable,n the generally expressed intent to invalidate all types
of secret liens,90 was sufficient basis for the Supreme Court in the Klauder
case.91 That decision permits the trustee to invalidate an assignment ex-
ecuted in jurisdictions following Deare v. Hall, if the creditor-assignee has
not notified the account-debtor. As earlier suggested, this conforms with
the basic aim of Section 60-to require from all reditors the public notoriety
of their transfer demanded by local law.
2
the A.L.I. but rested its decision more broadly on general principles of equitable estoppel.
88. See note 22 supra. The rule is still followed by Iova, Kentucky, Montana
(probably), New Jersey, and West Virginia. ASEimcAN BAN-xvs Ass'.;, Accou.-;Ts Rn-
cEivABLE: LisTs OF STATES (1944).
89. Apparently through an oversight for which Professor McLaughlin apologizes.
McLaughlin, Definb a Preferen;ce hi Bankruptcy, 60 HARv. L. REV. 233, 245-6 and n.31
(1946).
Legislators soon realized the possibility of applying § 60 to accounts receivable, hot,-
ever. An amendment was introduced in 1940 to except this transaction from the bona
fide purchaser test of perfection but was buried in committee. S. 3554, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1940).
Commentators have compensated for the draftsmen's failure to consider the position
of assignment of receivables in bankruptcy. See Bennett, Assignmcnt of Accounts Re-
ceivable Under the Chandler Act, 44 Com..L. J. 404 (1939) ; Cohen and Gerber, Mort-
gages of Accounts Receivable, 29 GEo. L. J. 555 (1941) ; Douglas, Assigned Accounts as
Affected by Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act and the Provisions of State Law uith
Reference Thereto, 19 J. N. A. RxV. BANKR. 11 (1944); Hamilton, Effect of Section C0
upon Assigned Accounts Receivable, 26 VA. L. Rnv. 163 (1939) ; Kupfer and Livingston,
Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder Revisited, 32 VA. L. R-v. 910 (1946); Me-
Laughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HAv. L. REv. 233, 249-50 (1946);
Mulder, Ambiguities in the Chandler Act, 89 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 10, 25-6 (1940) ; Neuhoff,
Assignment of Accounts Receivable as Affected by the Chandler Act, 34 IL. L. RLn.
538 (1940) ; Comment, 26 VA. L. Rnv. 168 (1939).
Since the early amendments of § 60 were concerned only with state recordation stat-
utes, and assignments of accounts receivable were formerly governed solely by judicial
decision, there was until 1938 no question of their validity, provided that, when executed,
they were not voidable preferences, and did not constitute fraudulent conveyances within
the doctrine of Benedict v. Ratuer, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). Petition of National Discount
Co., 272 Fed. 570 (C.C.A. 6th 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 635 (1921) ; Robertson v. Hen-
nochsberg, 1 F.2d 604 (W.D. Tenn. 1924) and cases cited. See 3 CoLrx=% BA;xmturc-
9634.
90. Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary ons HR. S046, 75th ong., 1st Sess.
122-5 (1937) ; H.R. RrP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1937).
91. See note 29 supra.
92. See p. 832 supra. According to Professor Hanna, non-notification financing, re-
gardless of local law, is not properly classified as a secret lien: "Most talk of secret liens
seems to belong to a dream world." Credit is extended, he argues, not on the basis of
the debtor's visible assets, but on his financial statements and information furnished by
credit services. Hanna, Some Unsolved Aspects of Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act,
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It will be recalled that the rationale of In re Vardaman would allow the
trustee similarly to invalidate an assignment executed in jurisdictions adopt-
ing the Massachusetts rule, if the assignee has failed to notify the account
debtor. The hysteria which greeted In re Vardaman proved, however, un-
warranted; three years later, the problem was again considered in the federal
courts.9 This time, a conflict of laws difficulty required the court to ground
its decision on the Massachusetts, the English or the New York rule. As-
suming, arguendo, that the Massachusetts rule applied, with the resultant
possibility that a subsequent bona fide purchaser (assignee) could acquire
an interest superior to that of the creditor-assignee by taking some action
against the obligor, the district court rejected the Vardaman rationale, refus-
ing to pile hypothesis on speculation to the destruction of the statute's
purpose."'
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, grounding its opinion on the lower
court's finding that the assignment had been perfected, under controlling
New Jersey law, when executed. While voicing no express stand on In re
Vardaman, the court left little doubt of its condemnation of that anomalous
decision. 95 Although the trustee's petition squarely raised the issue of the
Vardaman rationale,"8 the Supreme Court denied certiorari."7
43 Co,- L. REv. 58, 69 (1943); Hanna, Extension of Public Recordation, 31 CoL. L. Riv.
617, 623-30 (1931). Inspection of questionnaires used by Dun & Bradstreet, however, in-
dicates the importance with which credit rating agencies view the assignment of accounts.
A questionnaire submitted by the American Bankers Association to bankers in Missouri
and California which have adopted recordation statutes, asked: "Can financial statements
be a satisfactory substitute for a filing statute generally, and for a bank which, as an un-
secured creditor, wants to know promptly when a borrower assigns his accounts ?" Re-
plies from both states were emphatically in the negative. LrGAL Dm., AEmm. BANNE1S
Ass'N, REPORTS oN OPEATIoN OF FILING STATUTES IN CALIFORNIA AND Mxssouma 2 (Jan.,
1947). For another view as to the efficacy of financial statements, see Emory and Slat-
tuck, Assigned Conditional Sale Contracts and Accounts As Collateral, 11 WAsn. L. RFV.
181, 190-1 (1936).
93. In re Rosen et at., 66 F. Supp. 174 (D.N.J. 1946), aff'd, 157 F.2d 997 (C.C.A.
3d 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 835 (1947).
94. ". . . I do not construe [the Klauder case] ... to imply that the lower courts
may imagine conditions which have no foundation in fact. To do so would be to malus
the subject ridiculous .... This court cannot imagine ... the absence of a validly
consummated assignment . . . when one actually exists, nor can it imagine impossible or
unlawful conduct on the part of the parties thereto ... " In re Rosen et al., 66 F. Supp,
174, 179 (D.N.J. 1946).
95. ". . . the favored position acquired by the subsequent assignee in the situations
noted in Restatement Contracts (1932) § 173, comes not from his status as a bona fide
purchaser, but from his activities following his belated assignment." In rc Rosen et al.,
157 F.2d 997, 1001 (C.C.A. 3d 1946) (italics added).
96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pp. 6-7, In re Rosen et at., 157 F.2d 997 (C.C.A.
3d 1946).
97. 330 U.S. 835 (1947). In the Kiauder decision, the Supreme Court noted that
... many states do not require notice to the debtor to foreclose possible superior
rights of subsequent assignees," citing 2 WiLuLsTrN, CoNTRAcTs § 435 (Rev. Ed. 1938)
(discussing Massachusetts and English rules). 318 U.S. 434, 441 (1943). This would
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Reacting to the Klauder decision and its application in In re Vardaman
with surprising alacrity, twenty-nine states have passed legislation dealing
with the assignment of accounts receivable.S The first type, supported by
the American Bar Association and patterned after the New York rule, "vali-
dates" the assignment when executed and provides that a subsequent as-
signee who collects from the obligor is accountable to the first assignee.
Unless its original execution constitutes a preference, an assignment in juris-
dictions adopting this statute cannot be attacked under the Chandler Act. -*3
Recordation statutes, suggested by the American Bankers Association 101 and
adopted by twelve jurisdictions,0 2 provide for perfection of the assignment
by filing of notice with the local authorities. 1 3 The third type requires an
seem to imply that the trustee could not invalidate an assignment in jurisdictions follow-
ing either the Massachusetts or the Newr York rule.
98. For extensive discussion of these statutes, see Douglas, Assigncd Accounts as
Affected by Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act and the Provisions of State Law ith
Reference Thereto, 19 J. N. A. Rr. BArxm. 11 (1944); Koessler, Assignment of Ac-
counts Receivable, 33 CArw. L. R-v. 40 (1945) (pro and con: recordation v. validation
type of statute); Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Ac-
counts Receivable, 44 MICH. L. Rsv. 563 (1946); Montgomery, Reziew of Supreme Court
Ruling on Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 17 J. N. A. Rx. B,.nm. 119 (1943);
Crane, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Chattel Security, 8 U. op Pnvr. L. Rm.
104 (1942) (discussing Pennsylvania bookmarking statute); Comments, 9 Mo. L. Rm'.
167 (1944) (analyzing Missouri recordation statute), 17 So. CAxaF. L. REv. 303 (1944)
(analyzing California recordation statute).
99. Fifteen states have adopted such legislation: Ark. Laws 1945, No. 118; Co.,..
GiNL. STAT. § 644g (Supp. 1943); IL.. STAT. ANN., c. 121g, §§220-2 (Jones, Supp.
1947) ; IND. STAT. AxN. §§ 19-2101-19-2104 (Burns, Supp. 1945) ; Maine Laws 1945, c.
100; AD. CoDE A.NN, Art. 8, § 1A (Flack, Supp. 1943); MAss. STAT. Amr., c. 107A,
§§ 1-6 (1947) ; MicH. STAT. AxN. §§ 19.841-19.852 (Supp. 1947) ; -ni . STAT. §§ 7247-
11-7247-15 (Mason, Supp. 1946) ; N. H. Laws 1945, c. 19; Oma Comp. LAws ANN. § 62a-
101 (Supp. 1947); R.I. Acrs 1943, c. 1345; S. D. LAws, c. 213 (1945); VA. Conz A.-m.
§ 5767a (Supp. 1946) ; Wis. LAws, c. 206 (1945).
100. Under the New York rule, after which the "validation" statutes are patterned, an
assignment is "made" when executed, without notification to the obligor. Rorkhmore
v. Lehman, 129 F2d 892 (C.C.A. 2d 1942), revcrsing 123 F2d 564 (CC.A-2d 1942).
101. LEGAL DE ., Ama. BANERs Ass'N, AccouNTs r.CMAMnr-Frt.no STATUTZS,
TNTA=TE DRArr (Feb., 1947).
102. CAL. Civ. CoDE §§3017-29 (Deering, Supp. 1947); Colo. Laws 1947, c. 120; Fla.
Laws 1947, c. 24297; Idaho Laws 1945, c. 172; Mo. rmv. ST.,r. ANN:.. §5 3347.1-3347.6
(Supp. 1947) ; OHio Gmnr. CoDE AN.. §§ 8509-3-8509-6 (Page, Supp. 1947) ; OxaA. STAT.
AxN., tit. 15, §§631-7 (Supp. 1947) ; S. C. Laws 1946, No. 433; TEx. Rz,. STAT. Amn.,
Art. 260-1 (Vernon, Supp. 1947); UTAH CoD AN. § 81 (Supp. 1947); Wash. Laws
1947, c. 8. An amendment to § 70, proposed since this comment w.-as vrtten and coupled
with the Hobbs bill proposing revision of § 60a, would invalidate as against a trustee in
bankruptcy, all assignments of accounts not filed with the proper federal district court,
in lieu of individual state recording acts. H.R. 5834, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1943).
103. The notice usually must state the names and addresses of the prospective or actual
assignor and assignee. Details as to the nature and amount of the accounts assigned are
not required.
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appropriate notation on the books of the assignor.10 4 Where there are either
bookmarking or recordation acts, the Klauder decision still governs; an as-
signment is not "made" until the assignee has completed that act of perfec-
tion demanded by local law.
Where the rule of Dearie v. Hall is held not to prefer the assignor's lien
creditors over the assignee, regardless of non-notification of the account-
debtor, 105 the proposed amendment would nullify the Klauder decision. This
result would be the same as that now obtaining under the Massachusetts
and New York rules and "validation" statute. No change in the present law
would occur, however, in those jurisdictions following the English rule which
do subject assignments, under such circumstances, to the claims of the as-
signor's creditors. 16 Moreover, since recordation statutes explicitly protect
creditors of the assignor from unpublicized assignments, the suggested per-
fection test would still enable the trustee to invalidate belatedly filed trans-
fers of accounts receivable in these states.
The "Imperfectible" Transfers
Some security transactions are virtually "imperfectible" according to lit-
eral construction of the test prescribed by the Chandler Act. Despite full
recordation in compliance with the applicable statutes, the conditional sale
for resale,'17 the freehanded mortgage of stocks in trade,10 s the trust receipt 10
and the factor's lien 110 can never be validated against bona fide purchasers
without notice; the latter are relieved by both judicial and statutory law
from the burden of checking local records to ascertain whether their pur-
chases, made in the ordinary course of trade, are free from prior claims. The
secured creditors in such situations can never completely "perfect" the trans-
action. Must these transfers a fortiori be treated as occurring immediately
before bankruptcy, at which time the elements of a preference are deter-
mined? The advocates of the proposed amendment so insist,"' despite the
lack of any case so holding.
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1803 (Supp. 1945) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, §§'561-3 (Pur-
don, Supp. 1946).
105. Garford Motor Truck Co. v. Buckson, 4 Harr. 103, 143 Atl. 410 (Del. 1927);
Hall v. Kansas City Terra Cotta Co., 97 Kan. 103, 154 Pac. 210 (1916) ; Schoolfield v.
Hirsh, 71 Miss. 55, 14 So. 528 (1893); Lewis v. Holdredge, 56 Neb. 379, 76 N.W.
890 (1898). See 2 WI.LISTON, CoNnTcrs § 434 and n.2 (rev. ed. 1936).
106. Golsan v. Powell, 32 La. App. 521 (1880) ; Dillingham v. Traders' Ins. Co., 120
Tenn. 302, 108 S.W. 1148 (1908) ; Wolcott v. Mongeon, 88 Vt. 361, 92 Atl. 457 (1914).
Thus the proposed amendment would fall short of its own intended objective. See Hanna,
Preferences in Bankruptcy, 15 U. OF CHI. L. R V. 311, 322 (1948).
107. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 9.
108. 2 Glenn, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PaRFERENcEs §§ 582-94; Cohen and
Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 COL. L. REy. 1338 (1939); Snedeker, Security
Devices and Section 60A of the Chandler Act, 22 ORE. L. REv. 307, 324-6 (1943).
109. UNIFOI TRUST REcEIPTs ACT §9-2 (a). See Note, 26 CORN. L. Q. 306 (1941).
110. NEW YORK PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 45.
111. See commentators cited note 32 supra. Professor Hanna in his latest article,
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Certainly the history of legislative reform preceding the Chandler Act and
a scrutiny of committee hearings and reports indicate that the present Sec-
tion 60 was intended only to "insure a compliance with whatever public
notice is required by local law." 112 When the creditor so complies, the
transfer should be treated as perfected. The essence of the conditional sale
for resale, the freehanded mortgage, the trust receipt and the factor's lien
is the expectation that the goods will be sold to the consuming public, free
from prior liens. Consequently, the possibility of a bona fide purchaser in
the ordinary course of business is irrelevant in considering the perfection
test prescribed in Section 60. But the interest conveyed is fully perfectible
against purchasers, other than those in the ordinary course of trade, and the
debtor's creditors by recordation in compliance with local law. Construction
of Section 60 in the light of its overall purpose would make this compliance
the test of perfection.11 3
The proposed amendment, attempting to secure "imperfectible transfers"
against attack, would achieve only partial success. The rationale which pro-
tects the bona fide purchaser as against the entrustor, mortgagee of stocks
in trade or conditional vendor of goods for resale is extended by many juris-
dictions to lien creditors of the conditional vendee 14 and mortgagor.11 5
Literal application of the suggested perfection test in these jurisdictions
would be fraught with those very dangers which critics allege to be inherent
in the present Section 60.
If it is really thought that the present act threatens the validity of the
argues that the trust receipt and factor's lien are statutory liens, protected from the
operation of § 60 by § 67b. Hanna, Preferences it Bankruptcy, 15 U. oF CLr. L Rm'. 311,
320.
112. WErN Nsr, T E BAxKRupTCY LAW oF 1938, 120 (1938).
113. See Snedeker, Security Dezices as Preferences Under the Bannlrptcy Act, 8
Mo. L. R v. 85, 96, 102-5 (1943) ; Snedeker, Security Devices and Section 60A of the
Chandler Act, 22 Oma. L. REv. 307, 326 (1943). 3 Coumma, Btuamumc 958 urges a
relaxed application of § 60 in these cases.
114. In these cases, the conditional vendor is said to hold the vendee out to the vorld
as the owner of the goods; he is therefore held estopped from setting up his reserved
title against a creditor who may have acted on the basis of the ostensible ownership. Troy
Wagon Works Co. v. Hancok, 152 Fed. 605 (C.C.A. 7th 1906); Flint Wagon Works v.
Maloney, 26 Del. 137 (1911); Di Toco v. Horn, 153 N.Y.S. 93 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Scherl
v. Flarn, 129 App. Div. 561, 114 N.Y.S. 86 (2d Dep't 1903) ; Peck v. Heim, 127 Pa. 00,
17 Atl. 984 (1889); Star Clothing Mfg. Co. v. Nordeman, 118 Tenn. 384, 100 S.,V. 93
(1907); Loving Pub. Co. v. Johnson, 68 Tex. 273, 4 S.W. 532 (I87); Newcomb v.
Guthrie, 145 Va. 627, 134 S.E. 585 (1926).
But the more general rule, as illustrated by the Uniform Conditiodal Sales Act § 9,
protects bona fide purchasers only. See 1 WLLisToN, S.mams § 329 (1924) and cases cited.
115. The majority rule prefers the mortgagor's creditors over the mortgagee of
stocks in trade. Farmers' State Bank v. Kirkland & Brackin, 200 Ala. 146, 75 So. 894
(1917). For presentation of the rationale and doctrine evolved, see Cohen and Gerber,
Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 CoL- L. Ray. 1338 (1939) (cases cited n.14). See also
cases cited in Note, 97 A.L.R. 646, 677-80 (1935) ; 10 A-s. Jun. 7A-, § 103; 14 C. J. S.
807, § 203.
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conditional sale for resale, the freehanded mortgage, the trust receipt or the
factor's lien, the statute might easily be amended to take care of this particular
situation. To the last sentence of Section 60a could be added:
"Provided, however, that where the property so transferred was
for resale by the debtor in the ordinary course of business, the trans-
fer shall also be deemed to have been made at the time when it was
recorded or registered in conformity with procedure available under
applicable law, or at the date of execution if recordation procedure
is not so available."
This suggestion would except these transfers from application of the bona
fide purchaser test by allowing perfection by recordation or, in jurisdictions
not requiring publicity, by execution.
The wisdom of rigid interpretation of the present perfection test is also
questioned in the case of the pledge where temporary and limited possession
of the chattel has been restored to the pledgor. Here, the pledgee is usually
protected against the pledgor's creditors,' but bona fide purchasers take
free from his prior claim. 17 The pledge is not analogous to the trust receipt,
conditional sale for resale, the freehanded mortgage or the factor's lien. The
sole notice which the general public receives is from the actual delivery of
possession to the pledgee; the general creditors cannot inspect local records
and discover that the pledgor, in temporary possession, really does not
own clear title. Consequently, the Chandler Act should deem the transfer
"made" only when the pledgee reacquires possession."'
The proposed amendment, however, would protect the pledgee "tempo-
rarily out of possession," since his interest is usually superior to that of the
pledgor's lien creditor."9 This result, in effect, would invite a revival of the
secret lien and even fraud; who is to dispute the pledgee's insistence that he
had been permitting the pledgor to remain in possession only "for a tempo-
116. Hutton v. Arnett, 51 Ill. 198 (1869) ; Hilliker v. Kuhn, 71 Cal. 214, 16 Pac. 707
(1896), Clare v. Agerter, 47 Kan. 604, 28 Pac. 694 (1892). See 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PRrFRENcEs §490 and cases cited. The pledgee has been protected
against the trustee despite the latter's status under § 70(c) as a lien creditor with respect to
property in the debtor's possession at the time of bankruptcy. Petition of Chattanooga
Bank, 261 Fed. 116 (C.C.A. 6th 1919).
117. 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PRMaECcEs § 490 and cases cited;
RESTATEMENT, SEcuRnTY § 11, comment c (1941).
118. Snedeker, Security Devices and Section 60A of the Chandler Act, 22 Oan. L.
REV. 307, 322 (1943). Professor Glenn views with great alarm the threatened invalida-
tion of this type of pledge. ". . . at one stroke, a rule of pledge law would be abolished,
although it is so well established that the American Law Institute has included it within
a Restatement." 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 490. In his
latest article, Professor Hanna, however, doubts that the present § 60 would invalidate
this type of pledge; the date of the transaction is determined as of the time it was con-
summated by the pledgee's possession, regardless of subsequent retransfer to the pledgor.
Hanna, Preferences it Bankruptcy, 15 U. oF Cmi. L. REV. 311, 320 (1948).
119. See note 116 supra.
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rary and limited purpose"? If his claim cannot be disproved, general creditors
will lose out, despite the fact that they have no way of ascertaining the true
situation from the pledgor's outward appearance.
CONCLUSION
The 1938 revision of Section 60 followed forty years of fruitless effort to
outlaw the secret lien; the draftsmen could point to specific case-made re-
sults which merited statutory repeal. Now, for the first time in bankruptcy
history, the unrecorded real estate mortgage,1 - judgment assignment 12 '
and chattel mortgage 122 have been brought within the purview of the prefer-
ential transfer; most significantly, the equitable lien 12 3 has been condemned.
With the lone exception of In re Vardaman, these results have been
achieved without materialization of the evils allegedly inherent in the pres-
ent act. Undeterred, however, by reality, the draftsmen of the proposed
amendment would sacrifice many of the gains to remedy ailments largely
imaginary. 24 Admittedly, the present statute seems to threaten certain se-
curity devices. Interpretation of Section 60 in the light of its objective will,
however, avoid any harm. And spot amendments 125 and appropriate state
action 126 furnish additional safeguards if needed against extreme judicial
unreason far preferable to the drastic measure suggested.
But perhaps the most serious disservice performed by the present drive
for amendment is negative: it inhibits action against the actual deficiencies
in the present law. Unrecorded bailments are almost entirely beyond the
trustee's reach. The status of unpublicized conditional sales and trust re-
ceipts is at best conjectural. Any pressure for alteration in the statute might
better be aimed at including these devices within its scope than at demolish-
ing a structure whose early results have been markedly successful.
It has been pointed out that the proposed amendment reflects "the easy
money times of inflation and expanding credit in which we have been liv-
120. Matter of Cox, 132 F2d 881 (C.C.A. 7th 1943).
121. Matter of Hutcherson, 133 F.2d 959 (C.C.A. 7th 1943).
122. Matter of Greenberg, 48 F. Supp. 3 (D. fass. 1942).
123. Matter of Afarkert, 45 F. Supp. 661 (D. Mass. 1942) ; cf. Gins Y. Mauser Plumb-
ig Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974 (C.C.A.2d 1945).
124. "Certain problems generate an interest for teachers which may lead them to ex-
aggerate the importance of such problems to the business community.... Before em-
barking upon further adventures in amendment Congress should have before it detailed
information as to the pecuniary dimensions of the evil it proposes to remedy, and as to
the probable effect of the proposed amendment on edsting types of financing." Martin,
Substantive Regulation of Security Devices under the Bankruptcy Act, 43 Cor. L Rnv.
62,82,83 (1948).
125. This suggestion has been rejected by McLaughlin, Defining a Precfrence in Bank-
ruptcy, 60 HAv. L. Rnv. 233, 253-4 (1946) and Keefe, Kelly and Lewis, supra note 4,
at 113, but is approved by Martin, supra note 124, at 83.
126. Swift state reaction to the Klauder decision, supra p. 849, indicates the
practical validity of this suggestion.
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ing." 127 Despite these developments, bankruptcy must still choose between
the individually secured creditor who has elected to conceal his interest in
the debtor's property and the general creditors who required no protection
other than the latter's financial integrity. Equal distribution of the entlire
insolvent estate compels selection of the general creditor.
127. Oglebay, supra note 1, at 60. See speech by Daniel Webster, 8 CoNG. GLO1W,
26th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 814 (1840). Professor McLaughlin, drawing attention to
Webster's speech during House hearings, pointed out the function of the law of prefer-
ences in discouraging shaky extension of credit. Hearings before Commitllc on Judiciary
on H. 1. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1937). The Supreme Court impliedly has taken
cognizance of this function of § 60. See Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 439-41 (1943). Professor Hanna thinks little of the danger of
over-extension of credit and is outraged at the suggested use of § 60 in this manner: "It
is bad enough for the government to interfere with the conduct of individual business for
the correction of recognized evils without carrying this intrusion into realms invoking
dangers existing only in the inner consciousness of the advisers of the lawmakers." Hanna,
Some Unsolved Problems Under 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 COL. L. IZv. 58, 70
(1943).
